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ABSTRACT 
As universities in the United Kingdom gear themselves up for the next 
Research Excellence Framework, REF2021, with peer review at its core, we 
critically re-visit the idea of peer review as a gold standard proxy for 
research excellence. We question the premise that anonymous peer review is 
a necessary and enabling condition for impartial, expert judgement.  We 
argue that the intentions and supposed benefits underlying peer review and 
its associated concepts have become congealed in received discourse about 
research quality. Hence we explore the key conceptual issues raised by the 
nested assumptions and concepts that come into play in peer review as 
currently practised: primarily those of secrecy, anonymity, legitimacy, trust, 
impartiality, and openness. After delineating the benefits attributed to peer 
review, we contrast its declared virtues with its problematic features. We 
locate peer review in an audit culture in which the reviewer is an academic 
labourer. Drawing on recent trends in moral and political philosophy, we 
question the usefulness of the ideal of impartiality when tied to secrecy. 
Then we raise more deliberative, intersubjective possibilities for a revised 
understanding of peer review in the context of an academic community. 
Finally, we suggest ways in which the academic community could pursue 
quality in research by recasting peer review to be less secret and more 
open.  
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1 INTRODUCTION  
 
A path, a riddle, a jewel, an oath – anything can be secret so long as it is 
kept intentionally hidden, set apart in the mind of its keeper as requiring 
concealment. Sisela Bok (1989, p. 5) 
 
Peer review, still regarded as the ‘gold standard’ of quality judgment in research 
publications, is a high stakes activity that can make or break academic careers. Writing 
as both reviewers and reviewed, we have benefitted from peer review that has entailed 
constructive critique enabling us to improve our papers. We ourselves review in that 
spirit, and acknowledge that author anonymity can provide rejected authors with a form 
of protective privacy, arguably a form of confidentiality designed to protect their 
dignity. But, inevitably too, we have received reviews that are hard to fathom; reviews 
that, in Bok’s terms, are from supposed ‘peers’ whose identities are intentionally 
hidden, in words which read as riddles that sometimes allude to paths concealed. 
Following Bok (1989, p.9), our initial approach to secrecy is neutral and we 
acknowledge that ‘a degree of concealment or openness accompanies all that human 
beings do or say’.  With secrecy appropriate and necessary in some contexts, our focus 
is on secrets as ‘intentionally hidden … requiring concealment’ (Bok, 1989, p. 5). 
Hence we interrogate the intentions underpinning the secrecy of peer review, asking 
about its extent and consequences and questioning if concealment is actually required.  
Our scrutiny does not indicate a complete rejection of peer review. Rather we critically 
re-visit the idea of anonymised peer review as a gold standard proxy for research 
excellence questioning the assumption that it is a necessary and enabling condition for 
impartial, expert judgment. 
 
With respect to publications
1
, our scrutiny is timeous––as universities in the UK gear 
themselves up for the next Research Excellence Framework
2
 (REF), with peer review at 
its core. Indeed, it was that ‘gearing up’, aptly described as an ‘audit frenzy’ to assess 
each university’s ‘REF readiness’ (Lucas, 2017, p. 213), which initially motivated this 
work. While peer review, rather than bibliometrics, remains at the heart of the UK’s 
REF, across Europe performance based research funding systems similarly and 
frequently inform institutional funding
3
. Beyond Europe, Australia, Hong Kong, New 
Zealand and South Africa deploy research performance based funding systems (Hicks, 
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2012) and so philosophical attention to peer review merits attention as an 
internationally practised process of ever increasing relevance for the academic labourer 
and for the quality of our work.  
 
REF2021 throws peer review into sharp relief, casting a bright spotlight both on what is 
‘secret’ and what intentions motivate that secrecy.  As we examine why and how 
concealment imbues peer review, we explore the relationships between concealment 
and the exercise of power.  In considering understandings and modes of peer review 
and its importance in today’s academy, we also take heed of Biagioli’s (2002, p. 7) 
view that in light of ‘the remarkable epistemological and symbolic burden placed on 
peer review’, too little research has analyzed it. Acknowledging an upsurge of empirical 
research and debate on peer review in the last decade, we note that much of that activity 
has occurred in the sciences, with philosophical examination remaining scant. While 
peer review is often discussed and is frequently the target of criticism, academics 
including philosophers of education still:  
… do not frame it as an intellectual subject. Instead, they either confine it to 
private conversations or treat it as one of the practical aspects of the 
profession. (Biagiolo, 2002, p.7) 
We shift such conversations to a philosophical interrogation, arguing that the intentions 
and supposed benefits underlying peer review and its associated concepts have become 
congealed in received discourse about research quality. With the consequences of peer 
review increasingly significant for academic lives, we explore the key conceptual issues 
raised by the nested assumptions and concepts that come into play in peer review as 
currently practised: primarily those of secrecy, anonymity, legitimacy, trust, 
impartiality, and openness.  In section 2, after delineating the benefits attributed to peer 
review and its importance in publishing and in the REF, we contrast its declared virtues 
with its problematic features, locating these in an audit culture in which the reviewer is 
also an academic labourer working in an environment of managerialism and systemic 
distrust. Section 3 then draws on recent trends in moral and political philosophy, to 
probe the principle of impartiality, questioning its usefulness when tied to secrecy and 
raising more deliberatively intersubjective possibilities for a revised understanding of 
peer review in the context of an academic community. In concluding, we move in 
section 4 towards recasting peer review in a more open mode, in ways that might better 
serve the interests and contributions of our work, with reference to alternatives and 
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enhancements to current practices. In doing so we suggest ways in which peer review 
might become more open through deliberative processes which include development for 
peer reviewers and ongoing debate in academic communities about what makes for 
quality research.   
 
In suggesting ways of ameliorating the most pernicious aspects of secret peer review, 
we build on Conroy and Smith’s (2017) recent arguments in this journal on the ethics of 
the REF and its effects on the higher education sector. In many respects this paper is a 
response to their call to ‘go on speaking, not without a little irony’ as we ‘lean against 
the prevailing winds, for the deeper and more enduring ethical purposes and values of 
the university’ (Conroy and Smith, 2017, p.14).  Those prevailing winds have rendered 
peer view increasingly important and with far-reaching consequences that go beyond 
the quality of journals and the reputation of any academic discipline or university. 
 
2  THE PEER REVIEWER AS ACADEMIC LABOURER 
 
Pointing to the centrality of peer review in academic publishing, Jackson et al (2018, 
p.95) observe that it ‘is seldom acknowledged publicly as a normal part of academic 
work’. Focussed on that academic work with respect to forms of anonymised pre- and 
post-publication peer review, we provide an account of understandings of peer review 
and its importance. We locate the peer reviewer, both publications reviewer and REF-
related internal, institutional reviewer, as an academic labourer
4
––with that labour 
seldom acknowledged and, just as importantly, seldom theorised, publicly or 
institutionally.  The very practice of peer review, in its various forms, is often defended 
as the best form of judgment we have on the grounds of impartiality and the 
maintenance of quality standards.  But these defences merit scrutiny.   
 
Attempts to define peer review frequently refer to ‘expert’ judgments of reviewers and 
maintaining standards for ensuring high quality research. Wilsdon et al state: 
Peer review is a general umbrella term for a host of expert-based review 
practices including the review of journal manuscripts, peer review of 
applications for funding and career promotions, and national peer review-
based research assessments such as the REF. (2015, p. 59) 
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Acknowledging the variety of its meanings and forms, peer review is regarded by 
Wouters et al (2015, p. 44) as, ‘without doubt the most important method of quality 
control in the sciences, the social sciences, arts and the humanities’. Similarly, the Stern 
Review (UK Government, 2014), with its very significant influence on REF2021, noted 
that academics had pointed to the import and advantages of peer review over a metrics-
based approach to assessments of quality in publications
5
.  However, Stern’s report also 
acknowledges challenges in applying the ‘gold standard of peer review’ remarking that: 
‘At best, peer review is not a perfect “measure” ’ (UK Government, 2014, p.4).  But in 
an era of limited journal space and an unrelenting drive to ‘publish or perish’, peer 
review has long been seen as appropriate ‘to referee the competition’ in journals with 
limited space––although, with peers who may be researchers’ competitors, ‘prejudice 
and jealousy may lead to rejection and violation of academic freedom’ (Berry, 1980, p. 
639).  Of course, types and degrees of secrecy in peer review vary. High ranking 
journals in the social sciences
6
  frequently deploy a double blind peer review process in 
which the identities of the reviewed and reviewer are intentionally concealed
7
. We 
might more accurately refer to this form of review as ‘double blind double’ as it also 
entails that the reviewers and their reviews are concealed from each other
8
, while 
journal editors know the identities of both author and reviewers
9
.   
 
In common with most academics, we regularly assume several roles within this review 
regime, most frequently as authors with our own work put forward for pre-publication, 
anonymous double blind peer review. Perhaps most usefully, however, we benefit from 
peer feedback in open discussion at conferences and with peers. By contrast, as 
reviewers, we regularly collude with secrecy by reviewing anonymously for specialist 
journals in philosophy of education as well as more generalist and interdisciplinary 
education journals requiring the same double blind review systems.  
 
Across HE institutions, however, the role of reviewer has expanded to embrace 
reviewing internally because, using data from such peer review, universities assess their 
REF2021 readiness and implement strategies to enhance their chances of faring well in 
the next exercise. Institutional REF preparation across the UK continues apace as 
universities assess the readiness of individual academics to submit, almost always, at 
least one output predicted at 3* and preferably 4*, with a high quality submission 
carrying huge institutional advantages, both financial and reputational
10
.  This 
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preparation also involves calibration exercises, in which internal reviewers are 
themselves reviewed to assess the accuracy of their assessments of their peers’ work, 
frequently checked by external reviewers, with the expertise of members of previous 
REF panels much in demand. In REF2021 all staff with a research or research and 
teaching contract must be submitted with a minimum of one and maximum of five 
‘outputs’, with each output assessed according to its originality, significance, and 
rigour
11
.  While this paper is not exclusively REF focussed, the REF amplifies the 
urgency of scrutinising the peer review principle on which it depends.  Following recent 
draft guidance on REF submission
12
, Kernohan (2018) confirms that, ‘at every stage it 
is human judgment rather than metrics that forms the backbone of the REF’. That 
human judgment will be fallible is a truism, but the rejoinder that the best processes of 
peer review have in-built safeguards to ameliorate such fallibility deserves scrutiny with 
particular respect to the reproduction of secrecy.  
 
We are aware that practices currently underway across the sector in anticipation of 
REF2021 vary. Some internal, institutional REF related peer review activity is not 
anonymised at all, while some deploys a single blind process in which the authors’ 
identities are not concealed from reviewers while reviewer identities remain secret to 
the author. As in the REF itself, this is a form of post-publication review. However, in 
the REF the single blind process, in which the identity of authors is revealed to 
panellists, is slightly modified with the identities of panel members collectively known 
to the public, while individual reviews and scores remain secret
13
. Additionally, while 
the criteria for ‘excellence’ are not concealed, peer review renders the processes of 
selection secret for entry to the REF in some institutions.  
 
As we peer review, subject ourselves to peer review, and are reviewed as reviewers, 
there is, as we noted in our introduction, much at stake. The reviewer, reviewee and 
reviewed reviewer may have secret identities in some review processes but they are also 
selves whose identities are located in a discipline (in our case philosophy of education), 
and as employees in a higher education sector that is performatively driven and highly 
competitive. But peer review has tentacles beyond the REF: it is a high stakes activity 
for individual academics as well as their employer institutions. A requisite number of 
papers judged through several layers of peer review to be of an adequately high 
standard ensure one is ‘REF-able’. But, following McCulloch (2017, pp. 512-3), such 
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judgments also enable academics to ‘be employable and promotable, and, ironically, to 
gain access to the time and support necessary to facilitate the production of good quality 
research … not only in order to progress in their career, but also to keep their current 
job and avoid sanctions’. More positively, a good peer review and resulting publications 
can give one’s work an audience, new networks of correspondents and potential 
collaborators, as well as enhanced influence in the field of study.  
 
Of course, the secrecy underpinning such review processes has honourable intentions.  
While noting that ‘the exact beginnings of anonymous peer review are a bit more vague 
than those of peer review itself’, Gould (2010, p. 437) suggests anonymous peer review 
was originally intended ‘to generate more candid evaluations unaffected by personal 
feelings or institutional biases’. Hence concealing the identity of reviewers is defended 
on the grounds that this offers protection from bias since reviewers are “third party” 
participants (Smith, 2006, p. 178). However, concludes Smith (2006, p. 179), editor of 
the British Medical Journal for 13 years: 
… we have little evidence on the effectiveness of peer review, but we have 
considerable evidence on its defects. In addition to being poor at detecting gross 
defects and almost useless for detecting fraud it is slow, expensive, profligate of 
academic time, highly subjective, something of a lottery, prone to bias, and easily 
abused. 
Highlighting the subjective and secretive nature of much peer review, Hirsch et al 
(2017, e5) call for journal editors to ensure impartiality to protect against reviewer bias. 
We acknowledge the power of editors and editorial boards, and the extent to which 
academic communities rely on them to exercise fair and informed judgment, especially 
when some reviewers, on close scrutiny, can be biased, uninformed but nonetheless 
ready to make influential judgments of work with sometimes unfairly destructive and 
wide-ranging consequences for their authors. We will return to the responsibility of 
editors and interrogate the notion of impartiality as a defence for secrecy in the next 
section, but we turn now to the role of today’s academic labourer acted upon and active 
in peer review.  
 
In today’s academy, the role of peer reviewer has extended from its initial construal as 
an apparently impartial judge of quality in journal publication, acting on behalf of a 
discipline and providing free labour to publishers
14
, to that of employee reviewee and 
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reviewer. The peer reviewer today is hence a functionary increasingly complicit in the 
exercise of power, an academic labourer enabling her employer to manage fellow 
academics. We do not intend this observation to dismiss peer review as such, and as 
loyal employees of our own university and members of a disciplinary community of 
philosophers of education we do our best to contribute with integrity to all the types of 
review described here. But at this stage in our argument our point is to warn of the 
dangers of naively failing to recognise the problematic tensions now imbricated in the 
role of peer reviewer. So as we interrogate the role of the ‘peer’ and of secrecy in 
reviewing practices, it is necessary to recognize that confidentiality in peer review is 
one of several ways in which power operates secretly to normalize academics’ 
professional behaviour (Baez, 2002, p. 168).   
 
In exercising philosophical vigilance in the face of the appropriation of peer review into 
the ‘audit explosion’ that many believe poses considerable risk to the moral integrity of  
the university, the concept of trust has an acute relevance to our argument in two 
senses: implied distrust and unqualified trust. The first of these requires us to note, as 
Power has argued (1997), that although checking up is sometimes justified, the impulse 
to audit implies a degree of systemic distrust, a need to check up. While providing an 
account of ourselves ‘sustains the fabric of normal human existence’ (Power, 1997, 
p.1), checking up on one another through the many forms of monitoring that now 
characterise the ‘audit society’ comprises far more than a set of merely technical tasks. 
It shapes our very understandings of the issues it is supposed to address and constitutes 
a style of regulation with profound implications. ‘Auditing may be a collection of tests 
and an evidence gathering task, but it is also a system of values and goals which are 
inscribed in the official programmes which demand it’ (Power, 1997, p.7).  
 
Whether external or internal to an organisation like a university, audit is never neutral. 
It has unintended cultural effects that alter, in the context we are discussing here, the 
peer and author selves as well as the institutions whose performance the audit intends to 
regulate. Yet, with its ‘incentive effects’, more auditing does not necessarily lead to 
greater accountability and the consequences as well as the intentions underpinning 
auditing’s secrecy demand attention. Power’s observation that ‘Assumptions of distrust 
sustaining audit processes may be self-fulfilling as auditees adapt their behaviour 
strategically in response to the audit process, thereby becoming less trustworthy’ (1997, 
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p. 135) has been vindicated as universities have, understandably, tried to ‘game’ the 
rules of each iteration of audits of research excellence over several decades. While the 
past practice of ‘buying in’ researchers offering a brace of probable 4* outputs has been 
headed off for REF2021 by a change in the rules, authors and reviewers are nonetheless 
closely attuned to the criteria that demand  that outputs demonstrate significance, 
originality and rigour
15
. They will, to varying degrees and sometimes slavishly, adjust 
their practice to the culture of review and to writing to the rules of the coming audit of 
their research excellence.  So with peer review a high stakes activity for all academics, 
it merits interrogation––not least with respect to its fallibility and the need to question 
the intentions and consequences of its secrecy in the current audit climate. This is 
particularly urgent if we, as an academic community, are to avoid peer review further 
infiltrating funding and appointment systems ‘based on a fetishised image of this 
concept’ (Derricourt, 2012, p. 137), in which, following secretive peer review, the 
identities and reputations of academic labourers may be shaped. 
 
As the impulse to review all types of performance grows, so the pool of qualified peers 
is likely to become too small for the many acts of review required. With so much 
reviewing in demand and the expertise of reviewers as well as their time stretched and 
diluted across a greater volume of reviewing, the risks of blind review will increase. 
Peer review is already controversial. While conceding that it may sometimes be 
valuable, Butchard et al remark (2017, Introduction) that anecdotally there is plenty of 
evidence of peer review’s pitfalls:  
Asked to share her own ‘horror stories’ in peer review for the Times 
Higher Education, Susan Bassnett
16
 comments that ‘it seems like a fine 
idea for work submitted to a journal, publisher or funding body to be 
assessed anonymously by independent experts’, but fears peer review 
‘has grown into a monster’ as a result of an increasing volume of work 
requiring review, with detrimental effects for both authors and reviewers. 
In this vein, most authors of academic papers submitted to journals in the hope of 
publication are able to contribute to a collective narrative in which our experiences 
range from illuminating, constructive peer reviews that may result in revision 
enhancements and ultimate publication, to grumpy dismissal with minimal feedback or 
doctrinaire refusal to read a paper on its own merits. Fair and sensible decisions by 
editorial teams can ameliorate the worst of such tendencies, with experienced and 
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principled editors exercising careful judgment in managing and acting on peer reviews 
(Derricourt, 2012).  
 
When peer review works well, the feedback it provides can be particularly instructive 
for early career researchers trying to learn the often opaque rules of academic practice. 
But while some reviewers conduct themselves as peers, others use the secrecy afforded 
by anonymous blind review to decline to act like peers who are equal participants in a 
shared academic community. Authors sometimes discover that blind reviewers seem to 
refer to criteria or expectations that were effectively secret at the time of submission. 
We are struck by the contingency inherent in processes of anonymous peer review as 
routinely practised. Sometimes we are lucky to have our work reviewed by a genuine 
peer who knows the field and bases her review not on what her own specific ideological 
stance may demand: she eschews judging the article on the basis of the paper she 
herself would have written or the different books she has read. Because luck and risk 
are part of the publication game, ‘unqualified trust’ is the second sense in which we 
deliberate on trust. Unqualified trust in the legitimacy of peer review is not warranted, 
granting peer review greater authority than it deserves.  Under such conditions of 
secrecy, why might we trust those who have the power to make decisions to make those 
decisions wisely, especially if the decisions they make are sometimes so surprising and 
of such consequence for those whose work is being judged? In the courts, by contrast, 
unless circumstances are exceptional, justice must be seen to be done; the identities of 
witnesses and the jury of one’s peers are not kept secret, and judgments as well as their 
rationales are publically available.  
 
A possible rejoinder is that peer reviews are judgments that must occasionally take the 
form of gate keeping, on the assumption that some mistakes might be made, with some 
reviews perhaps too harsh but, if the bar is kept high, overall quality will ensue. In 
general, so this response might go, there is a good chance that those outputs that get 
past vigilant reviewers are probably of a sufficiently high quality to be worth 
publication. Occasional over-harsh reviews will at least support this worthy goal. The 
problem with this stance is that it confirms the contingency of peer review, that it is a 
crude measure that occasionally lets work later revealed to be of dubious merit through 
the gate, and fails to take seriously the collateral damage to the work and careers of 
those whose work is severely judged. So, too, this contingency may result in the non-
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publication of papers that are later revealed to be original, significant and rigorous
17
. 
This discourages trust in a system whose procedures and underlying assumptions are of 
such immense consequence for all academic labourers.  
 
Against this background, we might also ask why philosophers of education, for all their 
evident interest in critiquing performativity in educational institutions––as well as their 
close attention to analysing and defending concepts like professional agency and 
criticality––submit so meekly to the REF regime and participate in peer review in all of 
its forms and in all of their identities. We might usefully question our possible 
complicity in the more managerialist uses of peer review in the economy of the 
university. Of all researchers, philosophers of education, located as they are in Unit of 
Assessment 23 Education, might be expected to be alert to the language and ethics of 
the REF process and its requirements as well as to its avowed benefits for the academic 
community. Philosophers of education, so well-versed in theories of power and 
discourse, are located well to scrutinise the authority of peer review as a disciplinary 
mechanism. They are ideally placed to put the concepts we frequently use in critical 
comment about schooling or higher education to work in interrogating practices close to 
our own work and being as academics, including describing our publications in 
industrial terms as ‘outputs’, as if  produced by ‘knowledge workers’ (Conroy and 
Smith, 2017, p. 10).   
 
  
3 THE PEER REVIEWER AS JUDGE OF RESEARCH QUALITY: FROM 
‘IMPARTIALITY’ TO PUBLIC DELIBERATION 
 
The peer reviewer is routinely portrayed as an impartial judge of research quality, and it 
is widely held that, ‘Impartial peer review is central to the scientific endeavour that all 
of us are engaged in…’ (Miller et al, 2013, p.120). In its explanation of peer review the 
publisher Elsevier also emphasises the principle of impartiality, confidently asserting 
that ‘Reviewer anonymity allows for impartial decisions – the reviewers will not be 
influenced by the authors’
18
. We question this widely held depiction of the peer 
reviewer as an impartial, knowledgeable judge of research quality. The very idea - 
indeed the possibility - of impartiality demands close scrutiny, as do the forms of 
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secrecy that inform the impartiality attributed to peer review. The assumption that 
anonymity fosters impartiality does not stand up to scrutiny.  
 
Being an impartial reviewer implies that all submissions merit equal consideration, 
applying an appropriate set of criteria even-handedly. Impartiality fostered by 
anonymity thus precludes both favouring one’s friends’ work and taking a biased 
approach to those one dislikes or does not know, which might include those critical of 
one’s own publications or who take a different ideological stance. Anonymity seems 
likely to head off the danger that a reviewer will warmly recommend work submitted by 
those known to her  and  perhaps those from her own university, aware of its 
competition with others to excel in the REF and to climb the league tables that feed off 
it
19
.  Yet anonymity will not, in practice, guarantee this and it does not necessarily 
enhance impartiality. It is no protection when an anonymous author’s arguments and 
theoretical assumptions - which can hardly be kept secret - offend a reviewer: for 
example, when a liberal feminist author errs, in the eyes of a ‘poststructuralist’ 
reviewer, by referring to young people who have been sexually exploited as ‘victims’
20
 
. Feminist authors who offend malestream epistemologists by writing about women’s 
knowledge, or philosophers of education writing in a particular tradition and having 
their work reviewed inflexibly by orthodox proponents of a rival tradition, can have that 
work dismissed from behind a screen of supposedly impartial anonymity, even if their 
named identities remain a secret. One reviewer’s bête noir can seem perfectly 
reasonable to a reviewer operating in a different discipline or intellectual tradition: for 
example, a reviewer’s mistaking an illustrative vignette for an empirical claim, or 
misinterpreting a conceptual distinction as committing the error of creating a ‘binary’, 
or confusing a paper that is ‘well-written’ with one that is philosophically rigorous – 
types of ignorance to which philosophers are particularly vulnerable at the hands of 
those from other fields. Philosophers of education may be also be vulnerable to internal 
review by colleagues judging their work not to be ‘proper research’ as it has neither 
collected nor analysed first or second order data. 
 
Revisiting the principle of impartiality in academic publishing and its unquestioned 
status in the quality discourse of the university can benefit from attention to recent 
reconsideration of the ethics of impartiality in moral philosophy, which has been driven 
largely though not exclusively by feminist scholarship (e.g. Young, 1990). This work is 
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salient to both the ethics of peer review and the wider moral economy of the university. 
Friedman has acknowledged the allure of impartiality, suggesting that as a principle 
‘moral impartiality calls upon the moral agent to give equal consideration to the morally 
relevant interests of all persons’ (1993, p. 3). But not only is partiality sometimes 
appropriate, as we will argue later; for Friedman ‘the impartial standpoint is humanly 
impossible’ (p. 3) and she recommends replacing pursuit of impartiality with paying 
attention to eliminating ‘specific biases’ from moral thought (p. 11). If Friedman is 
right in defending the identification and correction of specific biases as an indirect route 
towards the problematic ideal of impartiality, she might be interpreted as endorsing the 
now popular online unconscious or implicit bias training
21
 that peer reviewers are 
commonly required to take before being let loose on others’ ‘outputs’. But her argument 
goes further:  
Coupled with the empirical assumption that people in general lack privileged 
access to their own biases, this approach, I suggest, invites us to appreciate the 
crucial role played by moral dialogue in the recognition of bias and, in this 
respect, the practical intersubjectivity of the enterprise of critical moral thinking.  
Friedman (1993, p. 11) 
In her account of how others’ biases could be corrected through the expression of 
competing points of view, Friedman (1993) draws on discourse ethics to contrast her 
defence of  interpersonal dialogue in normative reflection with what Habermas (1979) 
has described as the ‘monological’ approach that assumes an isolated reasoner. 
Suggesting that monological theories ‘overlook the possibilities for achieving 
impartiality that inhere in interpersonal dialogue’, Friedman (1993, p.17) argues that a 
dialogic approach will enable people to ‘together self-consciously seek to eliminate the 
biases in each other’s moral thinking’, arguing that authentic dialogue is a prerequisite 
‘for eliminating or minimizing bias in normative thinking’.  
 
That our own biases are likely to remain concealed if we are forced to reflect unaided 
and in isolation is surely a reason to turn instead to interpersonal dialogue in reading 
and thinking about the research of others in peer review. Quality judgment here is as 
likely to benefit from such dialogue as is moral thinking. Peer review can fail to meet 
its best potential not only through bias, but also, occasionally, through sheer ignorance 
that could be corrected in communication with others. Serial, discrete and supposedly 
detached judgments of isolated anonymous reviewers, insulated from the opinions of 
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other peer reviewers, will not by definition be superior to those reached through more 
open, dialogical processes of review. Many experienced authors are able to cite 
examples of occasional breathtaking ignorance and carelessness revealed by reviewers 
whose lapses in expertise, confidently asserted from a position of anonymity, could be 
easily corrected if communication were possible.  Problems of this kind point to the role 
of editors to occasionally set aside bad peer reviews which, if advice were followed, 
could make a paper worse rather than better, and to mediate between sometimes 
conflicting reviewer opinions - when dialogue between them could offer a far more 
rational review process. Interpersonal, open, even public, dialogue, making one’s own 
thinking explicit and adjusting it in response to previously unnoticed considerations, 
offers a more reliable means to making informed and hence legitimate judgments of 
quality.  Indeed, in her study of the concept of secrecy, Bok observes that having to 
argue publicly is likely to create ‘the necessity to articulate one’s position carefully, to 
defend it against unexpected counter arguments, to take opposing points of view into 
consideration, to reveal the steps of reasoning one has used, and to state openly the 
principles to which one appeals’ (1989, p.114).  
 
The imperfections to which peer review and its uses are prone do not lead us to reject it. 
Nor are we entirely opposed to the principle of impartiality. Instead, we turn to recent 
developments in democratic theory for a means to further recast our understanding of 
judgments of quality that avoid bias, through interpersonal deliberation. In doing so we 
work off Shatz’s observation, in comparing peer review with democracy, that ‘it is the 
worst form of evaluation - except for all the others’ (Shatz, 2004, quoted in Butchard et 
al, 2017, p. 18)––reflecting on the deliberative turn in democratic theory. Just as 
Churchill’s famous observation is not a rejection of democracy, so too we do not aim to 
reject peer review so much as to critically evaluate its strengths, weaknesses and 
possibilities for reformulation, by now considering a way forward drawn from theories 
of democracy conceived as public reason.  
 
As a response to the criticisms of democracy construed primarily as aggregation of the 
individual preferences of voters by counting their votes in elections or referenda, a form 
of decision-making that might be compared with measuring the quality of publications 
through metrics, the deliberative ideal is commonly described as embodying ‘the “will 
of the people” formed through the public reasoning of its citizens’ (Bohman, 1998, p. 
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401).  In defending public deliberation among citizens who are free and equal, 
deliberative theory offers a path towards legitimate decision making for the common 
good (ibid.), even and especially in addressing complex problems in contexts of deep 
disagreement. The ideal of public reason offers a means to improved decision making. 
Deliberation that is free and open is more likely to be genuinely impartial, as the 
interests of all may be fairly taken into account in discourse that is open and dialogical.  
 
The idea of ‘deliberative impartiality’ offers a legitimate process of collaborative 
decision-making instead of ‘the ideal of the impartial transcendental subject’ (Button 
and Garrett, 2016, p. 49). When decisions are reached through processes that involve 
interpersonal forms of reasoning and are public by way of offering, weighing and even 
rejecting reasons available to all affected, legitimacy is made possible through what 
Dryzek (2001) has called ‘reflective assent’. Legitimacy can be enhanced by 
deliberation, in public decisions as well as in reaching decisions about publications, 
when there are opportunities for preferences to be transformed by confronting the 
preferences of others (Benhabib, 1996, p. 71). So, too, deliberative procedures generate 
legitimacy in part by imparting information, which no single individual can possess in 
full. Nor can one individual foresee all possible critical perspectives on a single issue 
(ibid). These deliberative ideals are envisaged as applicable not only to political 
institutions like parliaments and mass assemblies, but have been proffered in reflection 
on the workings of a range of institutions, ‘a plurality of modes of association in which 
all affected can have the right to articulate their point of view’ (Benhabib, 1996, p. 73). 
These overlapping and interlinked associations are seen by Benhabib to include 
voluntary associations and social movements as well as political parties. For us, this 
public sphere also embraces communities of academics and researchers. 
 
Blind, anonymous peer review, conducted in secret, casts the peer reviewer as a discrete 
actor, insulated from the contamination of judgments reached by other reviewers. We 
contrast this problematic construal with the peer reviewer as member of a public, a 
disciplinary community with shared interests in voicing their views about the discipline 
and the literature that represents it in the wider field of educational research and the 
general public at large. A disciplinary community, with its mutual commitment to 
influencing the course of educational policy and practice, and educational research in 
other disciplines, is more likely to be collectively influential through interpersonal 
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deliberation than entrusting judgments about potential publications so strongly to 
isolated, anonymous reviewers.  The community has an interest in exercising partiality 
in a collective commitment to support fellow scholars and for the health and survival of 
the discipline, rather than to impartiality simplistically conceived. Its members pay a 
price for the secrecy enforced by delegating judgments of quality to discrete individuals 
whose identities and opinions are concealed on the suspect assumption that this will 
make them impartial.  
 
 4 TOWARDS OPEN REVIEW 
 
Admirable intentions do not necessarily produce their intended consequences. Our 
scrutiny of peer review has questioned the assumptions that underpin entrenched peer 
review practices that are now increasingly harnessed to an audit regime in which 
academic labourers are complicit in the exercise of power over one another. Our 
analysis of these assumptions, and the associated concepts that legitimize peer review 
as currently practised, has contrasted secrecy with openness, with close scrutiny of the 
concept of  ‘impartiality’. While not dismissing the principle of impartiality, we have 
argued instead for interpersonal dialogue through more open forms of deliberation 
about research quality, which we claim are more likely to foster legitimacy and trust, as 
well as enhancing judgments of quality. What changes in current peer review practices 
might this suggest? 
 
Addressing ‘inherent issues in what has been the gold standard of double-blind peer 
review’, Open Peer Review (OPR) is, according to Ford (2015, p.2), ‘any scholarly 
review mechanism providing disclosure of author and referee identities to one another 
at any point during the peer review or publication process’.  OPR, available since at 
least the 90s (Tattersall, 2015), takes a variety of forms on a continuum of openness, 
pre- and post-publication, and with reviewers ranging from anyone who chooses to 
access and comment on a paper, who are journal subscribers, or reviewers allocated by 
the publication. Authors may be able to access and respond to reviews with author[s] 
and reviewer[s] named or degrees of openness may be optional with, for example, a 
reviewer able to opt for anonymity. Similarly reviews and author responses to those 
reviews may be published along with the publication.
22
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Criticising the ‘blackbox’ of traditional peer review for allowing reviewers, editors and 
authors
23
 significant power to subvert the process, Ross-Hellauer (2017) offers a 
schema of seven OPR traits including ‘open identities’ (p.7), alternatively termed 
signed or unblinded review. While advocates for OPR point to its potential to improve 
accountability as well as to provide credit for the academic labour of reviewing, Ross-
Hellauer (2017, p.9) also emphasises ways in which OPR might address some of our 
concerns about secret peer review, citing van Rooyen et al’s (1999, p.23) claim that ‘… 
it seems unjust that authors should be “judged” by reviewers hiding behind 
anonymity’.  However, studies conducted to date mainly in medicine, have shown no 
significant effects in favour of or against open identity reviewing and clearly further 
research is required before we could fully abandon secret identities in pursuit of reviews 
driven by the imperative ‘to bring greater transparency, accountability, inclusivity and 
flexibility to the restricted traditional model of peer review’ (Ross-Hellauer, 2017, p. 
11). 
 
That imperative is echoed in the first editorial of a new journal, The Public Philosophy 
Journal (PPJ
24
). Meeting some of our calls to recast peer review and to premise it on a 
more open, dialogic, and deliberative model, the PPJ uses ‘Formative Peer Review, ‘a 
structured form of peer engagement rooted in trust and a shared commitment to 
improving the work through candid and collegial feedback’
25
. This form of open 
identity peer review involves a deliberative open process with authors submitting drafts 
and nominating a reviewer in a review process explicitly intended to enhance the paper 
by encouraging responsiveness between the review participants with reviewers and 
reviewees working together, and certainly not in secret.  
 
Yet some may find such OPR processes too radical a response to the concerns we have 
raised here. OPR is not yet widely accepted by the academic community although a 
recent survey report (2015
26
) suggests support is increasing. We have argued that 
defence of anonymised secret peer review on the grounds that it affords impartiality is 
flawed, but such anonymity is also often defended on the grounds that its secrecy 
protects reviewers from retribution by reviewees. Pointing to this as a prominent reason 
for resistance to more open forms of review, Flier (2016, p. 2) notes that this ‘is hardly 
complimentary to the scientific community’ and ‘brings shame on a profession 
committed at its core to the pursuit of knowledge and truth’.  This is a challenging 
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rebuttal to this oft cited defence of anonymised peer review. It coheres, however, with 
our argument that we should interrogate the assumptions underlying any and all forms 
of peer review and, with respect to secrecy, that the defences that so frequently buttress 
anonymised peer review should be questioned. Putting philosophical scrutiny to work to 
question the intentions and consequences of secrecy in peer review does not, however, 
entail that we dismiss the realities of today’s competitive culture. It is perfectly feasible 
to conjecture that, pre- or post-publication, some of us have provided more favourable 
reviews if there was any likelihood that we could become known to the reviewee than 
those we might have given behind a cloak of secrecy. Hence it would be naive to 
entirely dismiss reviewer protection as a defence for anonymised review in an academy 
beset by performativity, audit and accountability. However, we do accept Flier’s (2016) 
call that we should not regard reviewee protection ‘as unavoidable’ and to be countered 
by secrecy ‘and its adverse consequences’. The wider problem should be addressed. 
That problem is an issue of power and often of patronage. It goes far deeper than peer 
review but against that background we offer a number of additional suggestions that 
might go some way to addressing the most pernicious elements of secrecy. 
 
A practical recommendation that emerges from our exploration of peer review pertains 
to training as part of a shift towards more open peer review. Peer review training has 
increased significantly in the last few decades with a multiplicity of online resources 
available
27
 and yet research, conducted mainly in medicine and the sciences, questions 
such training and, in some cases, points to no evidence of positive effects. This is 
summarised in a recent blog entry in which Khoo (2018) concludes that ‘peer reviewer 
training is not going to save peer review or populate publisher databases with high-
quality reviewers’ but that it may enable novice reviewers to ‘feel more confident or 
give them a chance to network within their discipline’. While Khoo alludes here to 
networking as a positive spin-off from training, we position this not as a spin-off but as 
an integral element of the peer review process, re-purposing networking as a strategy to 
offset the negative aspects of secrecy while enhancing peer review outcomes. The 
excellent technology-enabled peer review training already available might then become 
a component rather than an end of ongoing enhancement of peer review. That 
enhancement would be located in a collegial supportive environment in which 
deliberation with peers could address the challenges of secrecy with particular respect 
to bias and the dangers of inexpert judgments. Dialogue would be at the heart of such 
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developments, not only supporting novice reviewers but providing a space for even the 
most experienced reviewers to render explicit their thinking, their experience and their 
judgments. While not dissenting from Callaham and Tercier’s (2007, p.32) insistence 
that the requisite skills of peer review ‘may be as ill defined and hard to impart as is 
“common sense” ’, we do not dismiss skills training. Rather we locate it as one element 
of a broader deliberative approach designed to ameliorate the worst tendencies of secret 
peer review.  
 
Prompted by the urgency and proliferation of anonymised peer review in preparation 
for the REF we have argued that the so-called gold standard of peer review is tarnished. 
In focussing on dimensions of secrecy and its intentions and consequences we have 
sought to rupture what is, arguably, the unquestioning compliance that we, reviewers 
and the reviewed, exhibit at a time when peer review has far-reaching consequences for 
us all. As philosophers of education, we have an opportunity to engage with 
possibilities for forms of that review that do not merely accept that it is ‘the best we 
have’ but that strive to make it better. Such possibilities include the requirement to 
question the need for secrecy and to make peer review a more open dialogic activity 
premised on careful deliberation as part of both the review process and ongoing training 
for that process. Rather than continuing to accept the status quo, such possibilities could 
more aptly reflect our aspirations to sustain an academic community. Following the 
Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain (PESGB
28
) this would promote ‘the 
philosophy of education in a climate of inclusion, tolerance and respect for diversity’.
29
  
This entails bringing the challenges of peer review, especially its most secretive 
enactments, into the open, into debate with colleagues across the field of education.  
 
While REF2021 renders scrutiny of peer review urgent it also provides, if we are 
willing to stop and question it, an opportunity for deliberation.  That deliberation will 
not provide easy answers and we do not proffer a conclusive solution. Rather we have 
challenged the credentials of anonymous review, arguing that it could be made less 
secretive if we start from the premise that secrecy is no guarantee of impartiality or 
quality. The first onus is on those who insist on secrecy to more openly defend the 
rationale for that secrecy. The second onus is on all of us engaging in and judged by 
secretive peer review to question its intentions and to be aware of its far reaching 
consequences.  Finally, and to return to our epigraph, the secrecy of peer review should 
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surely not be a riddle: ‘a puzzle or joke in which you ask a question that seems to be 
nonsense but which has a clever or amusing answer’
30
.  Anonymised peer review 
should not be a puzzle. Its effects are far too important for it to be a joke and as it 
continues to shape our academic identities, peer review requires open deliberation, both 
in and about the process.  
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1
 We do not focus on peer review for grant applications but our argument is likely relevant to 
anonymous review of such applications. 
2
  The UK REF is ‘a process of expert review, carried out by expert panels’ with ‘three distinct elements … 
the quality of outputs (e.g. publications, performances, and exhibitions), their impact beyond academia, 
and the environment that supports research’ from http://www.ref.ac.uk/about/whatref/. We focus 
here on outputs.  
3
 See http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC101043/kj1a27837enn.pdf 
4
 We follow Allmer (2017, p.56) in using academic labour rather than academic work as ‘universities are 
part of capitalism and academics are embedded into class relations’. 
5
 ‘Outputs’ form 60% of the overall submission to any Unit of Assessment. 
6
 See, for example, the British Educational Research Journal, the most frequent outlet overall for 
Education in the 2014 REF, 
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/page/journal/14693518/homepage/forauthors.html.  
7
 Single blind review, by contrast, entails that editors and referees know the identities of authors while 
the identities of reviewers remain concealed to authors. 
8
 Some journals make other reviews available to reviewers once submitted and, often, when a 
publication decision has been made. 
9
 See https://orgtheory.wordpress.com/2007/01/23/a-modest-proposal-triple-blind-review/ for a 
proposal for, at least, triple blind review in which the editor is not aware of the author’s identity.  
10
 In Scotland, the funding stream related to REF is the Research Excellence Grant (REG), in England 
Quality-related Research funding (QR).  This funding was, following REF2014, allocated only to 3* or 4* 
outputs.  
11
 On average, this means 2.5 outputs per eligible staff member. 
12
 http://www.ref.ac.uk/publications/2018/draftguidanceonsubmissions201801.html 
13
 Final decisions on REF2021 will not be available until Winter 2018-19. 
14
 See, for example, Van Noorden (2013) on ‘free’ peer review labour provided to publishers who then 
charge significant sums for access to their journals.  
15
 See Murphy (2017) for gaming still possible in REF2021 and, on REF2014, Marginson’s (2014) blog 
entry on ‘Research excellence: getting better all the time – or is it?’, at 
https://ioelondonblog.wordpress.com/2014/12/19/research-excellence-getting-better-all-the-time-or-
is-it/ 
16
 “The Worst Piece of Peer Review I’ve Ever Received,” Times Higher Education, August 6, 
2015, https://www.timeshighereducation.com/features/the-worst-piece-of-peer-review-ive-ever-
received. 
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17
 See https://www.sciencealert.com/these-8-papers-were-rejected-before-going-on-to-win-the-nobel-
prize 
18
 https://www.elsevier.com/en-gb/reviewers/what-is-peer-review 
19
 See https://www.hepi.ac.uk/2018/01/04/guide-uk-league-tables-higher-education/ 
20
  As with our experience submitting a paper to a well-known journal.  
21
 See, for example, https://www.ecu.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/unconscious-bias-and-
higher-education.pdf , https://royalsociety.org/topics-policy/publications/2015/unconscious-bias/, 
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/, https://www.tolerance.org/professional-development/test-
yourself-for-hidden-bias. 
22
 See Ford (2015) for an example of OPR with reviewers/reviewed identities disclosed and 
reviews/responses published. 
23
 For example, authors can subvert the secrecy of their identities by, for example, self-citation.  
24
 http://publicphilosophyjournal.org/ 
25
 http://publicphilosophyjournal.org/about/review/ and see 
http://publicphilosophyjournal.org/about/review/ for details of PPJ peer review processes. 
26
 Mark Ware Consulting (2016) Publishing Research Consortium Peer Review Survey 2015, 
http://publishingresearchconsortium.com/ with 50% of respondents accepting open review but an 
ongoing reluctance to espouse signed reviews published with papers.   
27
 See, for example, http://peerreviewtraining.esrc.ac.uk/ and 
https://authorservices.wiley.com/Reviewers/journal-reviewers/becoming-a-reviewer.html/peer-review-
training.html, and https://hub.wiley.com/community/exchanges/discover/blog/2014/11/07/mentoring-
the-next-generation-of-reviewers  
28
 The parent society of this journal. 
29
 http://www.philosophy-of-education.org/ 
30
 https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/riddle 
